

14 JAN 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to DD/I (NSC)

SUBJECT: Draft Paper for the DCI's Briefing to the NSC on  
the Soviet Civil Defense Program

1. In accordance with Mr. Amery's instructions, we have prepared a paper on the Soviet civil defense program which can provide the basis for the Director's briefing to the NSC on Thursday of this week.

2. While the principal focus of this paper is on the Soviet shelter program, there are a number of paragraphs in the first part of this paper which, as I indicated to you this morning, cover civil defense training and which you might choose to eliminate as irrelevant. They were inserted primarily to put the shelter program in some context and to refute the rather clear implications of the American Embassy, Moscow, cable 896 of 4 November 1957, that such training activities were not taking place on any significant scale.

3. While it is obviously impossible to refute point by point the American Embassy, Moscow, observations in their cable 1290 of 9 January, we feel the paper very clearly contradicts the implications of the sentence in the first paragraph of that cable, which states that the Embassy has observed no signs of a Soviet program to construct shelters. In addition, we have indicated in paragraphs 2 and 9 the difficulty involved in observing civil defense preparations including the construction of shelters, which may in part account for the Embassy's failure to observe such activity. We have also indicated that some of the equipment for these shelters, including that required for hermetic sealing and air conditioning, may not be installed for some time after construction, which again could account for the failure of the Embassy to observe such equipment. We will have exhibits of Soviet shelter construction which were submitted by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Moscow cable 1210 specifically asked that this source be checked, possibly feeling that this source would confirm their belief that very little had been done on the shelter program, while in fact this source confirms and supplements other OHR evidence.

4. OHR personnel knowledgeable on this subject have held three meetings within the past four days with Department of State Intelligence specialists who are as satisfied with our attached draft as it is

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possible for them to be in the absence of any detailed research in this field on their part. Their very carefully drawn comments on this paper are attached in Tab C.

5. We have omitted reference to the number of people in the Soviet urban population who will probably have shelter protection by 1960. You will recall that this figure was previously given in our 5 November paper for the NSC. We are perfectly willing to have a figure of this magnitude used again. However, this is an extremely rough calculation and might be difficult to defend before a reluctant and critical audience, and we, therefore, felt that the Director might prefer to have this omitted from the briefing. Moreover, the figures which are presented outlining the general extent of shelter coverage as it now stands and stressing that this program is continuing are impressive and perhaps should not be undermined by less defensible figures estimating future coverage. However, I repeat we will play this anyway you think best suits the DCI's purposes.

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6. We hope to have the additional paper which you requested outlining some of the substantiating evidence late this afternoon or early tomorrow morning. In any event, [REDACTED] will have this material available in draft form if it is necessary for the Director's briefing this afternoon or late today. The exhibits should be available by noon tomorrow.

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[REDACTED]  
Deputy Assistant Director  
Research and Reports

**Enclosures:**

1. Tab A -- Briefing Paper on "The Soviet Civil Defense Program" - *attached*
2. Tab B -- Department of State cables #733, #836, and #1210. - *filed in OAD/RR*
3. Tab C -- Department of State memorandum, 14 January 1958. - *filed in OAD/RR*

*Appendix A -- attached.*

**Distribution:**

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## **THE SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM**

1. The Soviet civil defense program is not new; rather it represents a position achieved by the expenditure of considerable sums in construction, equipment and training over a period of years. There appears to have been an increase in the scope and cost of the program through the years but there is no evidence of a sudden acceleration in the intensity of the program since 1950-51, or that it is scheduled for completion coincident with a future target date set for the instigation of hostilities. The construction, equipment and training program has, however, continued to provide growing protection for an ever larger portion of the population.

2. Some aspects of Soviet civil defense are obscured by security precautions. It is admittedly difficult for foreign reporting officers to observe easily civil defense activities since indoctrination and training are accomplished through small groups in such places as factories and club rooms without being highly publicized, and some of the more obvious preparations such as the posting of shelter signs will not, in accordance with stated doctrine, be made until the declaration of an emergency. For example, little detailed information was available on Hungary prior to the uprising of 1956. When it became possible for intelligence to interrogate large numbers of Hungarians,

a vast panorama of civil defense preparation was revealed.

3. Civil defense in the USSR is the responsibility of the Main Administration of Local Antiair Defense (GUMPVO), an arm of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). Under GUMPVO is a body of civil defense staff officers who are assigned to posts at all levels of government and in many major economic enterprises where they supervise civil defense preparations.

4. The Soviet program demands specialized training for civil defense personnel and survival training for the urban population. A school for civil defense staff officers is operated in Leningrad. GUMPVO maintains a central scientific laboratory and a medical research installation.

5. The Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF) is the organization charged with giving civil defense training to the general population. DOSAAF units are formed in factories, institutions, offices, collective and state farms, machine tractor stations, schools, and dwelling units. Its membership is estimated at about thirty million at the present time. Most of its members probably have to take civil defense training courses. Completion of the initial atomic defense training program for the Soviet population was announced in 1957.

6. Although it is doubtful that all citizens have been indoctrinated under the program, training has probably been widespread in DOSAAF, in the Communist Party, and in key industries. To supplement the earlier air and chemical defense course, and the atomic defense course, every citizen of the USSR over 16 years of age is now to receive 22 hours of instruction in a new course in air defense, including atomic, bacteriological and chemical (ABC) defense. Such training is to be completed in large cities by mid-1958 and in the remaining cities and villages by the end of 1958. Widespread criticism by the DOSAAF press of the implementation of past civil defense training, as well as continuing reports by western observers of general apathy and even aversion to such programs, indicates that the achievement of these goals may be delayed.

7. First-aid training is conducted by the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies. Members of these societies would be used extensively as auxiliary personnel for medical organizations which have civil defense roles.

8. It is believed that training of operational units at the city or area level is now in progress. Civil defense paramilitary "battalions" have appeared in three European satellites, and civil defense preparations in these countries follow a common pattern under the leadership of the USSR. At least some of the officers of such units were trained in Leningrad.

9. It has been demonstrated in the case of Hungary that a considerable civil defense program can be obscured by security restrictions and compartmentalizing of information. Evidence similar to that received from the USSR was received on the civil defense effort in Hungary prior to the 1956 uprising. The level of public discussion and overt signs of preparation were not much greater than has been received from the USSR. Since then, many reports from refugees have solidly confirmed a civil defense program in that country including compulsory civil defense training, regularly held air raid drills in office and factories, the distribution of some civil defense supplies, and the mandatory inclusion of air raid shelters in basements of new building construction. Moreover, it was found that many large, heavily constructed shelters were being built in Hungary for government offices, for the personnel of important factories and for emergency communications centers and civil defense headquarters. It was also found that operative civil defense units to be assigned in principal cities were being organized and trained since 1954 into national-guard type units. Sirens were installed and civil defense duty officers were standing watch in city headquarters.

10. Civil defense officials in the USSR have on hand some emergency supplies; the principal satellites have been accumulating such supplies for several years. The exact level of these supplies is

unknown, but there is apparently more than is necessary for training.

11. By 1949 the USSR had initiated a program to include reinforced basement shelters in the construction of new public buildings, factories, schools, and apartment dwellings.

12. About 200 reports, including many from returning prisoners of war who worked on such construction, indicate that the inclusion of air raid shelters in new buildings is a standard practice. Soviet literature describes basement shelters as having sufficient strength to withstand the complete collapse of buildings. The shelters, designed to be gasproof, are fitted with hermetically sealed double doors. They are constructed to utilize filter ventilating systems, but most reports do not indicate actual installation, possibly because such systems were to be installed by Soviet workers or because installation was deferred to a later date. Prior to the installation of such filtration devices these shelters would be of limited value in protecting against fall-out. The construction of such shelters is continuing. The volume of new housing being built has already made apartment shelter available to workers as well as to government and Party functionaries. It is reassuringly stated in official Soviet publications on the subject that basement shelters are satisfactory protection against atomic weapons.

13. Isolated reports have been received that detached shelters, of strength and design comparable to basement air raid shelters, have

been built in the USSR. These have two entrances and are covered with about one meter of earth.

14. The precise extent of the Soviet shelter program is unknown. There is evidence that most state-owned housing of masonry construction built since 1951 has included some provision for a shelter area. In addition there are shelters in factories and public buildings. It is roughly estimated that at least 10 to 15 millions of the urban population would by now be furnished partial protection and the program for furnishing such protection is continuing.

15. In addition, a 1956 Soviet publication, as well as information on shelter-building activities in the European satellites, indicates that heavier bunkers and hillside tunnel shelters have been designed. The strength of these structures varies, but specifications have been reported for new bunkers in the satellites able to resist pressure as high as 65 pounds per square inch. Some European satellite bunkers have been reported furnished with medical supplies, tools, foods, auxiliary power generators, and communications installations. The installations are generally constructed at factories and enterprises of military importance and in proximity to Party and government offices or to transport and communications centers. Reports of a similar nature indicate that preparations of this type have been carried out in the USSR, although the number of such reports is limited.



16. In addition, some protected control centers have been prepared outside urban areas. For example, there are several confirmed locations of underground facilities near Sofia which are reportedly designated for the use of the Bulgarian government in an emergency. Satellite civil defense preparations appear generally to follow the Soviet model. It is believed that the Kremlin has already constructed or is now providing similar installations in the USSR to protect essential elements of the Party and government, the transportation and communications network, and workers in vital industries. The same general type of protection is probably being afforded civil defense headquarters, important telecommunications terminal facilities, and some broadcasting installations.

17. Information received during 1957 confirms the emphasis on civil defense preparations as well as the readjustments toward the nuclear concept of air defense. Hungarian refugees have reported extensively on heavy bunker and gallery-type shelters constructed in that country between 1952 and 1956.

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The latest extension crossing the Moscow river to the University, however, is being built over, rather than under that body of water. New manuals, film, and a television broadcast on nuclear

civil defense subjects appeared in the USSR during 1957.

13. Although occasionally mentioned by satellite sources, the concept of evacuation of cities for nuclear defense has not been mentioned in Soviet publications. The population is advised to seek locally available shelter in the event of air attacks. Soviet civil defense publications advise construction of field-type shelters upon declaration of a "threatening situation" in the event formal shelter is not available.

ORR/CIA  
14 January 1958

APPENDIX A

EVALUATION OF DATA

Evidence of a nationwide program of basement shelter construction incorporated into new state housing starts in the USSR and Soviet bloc is substantial. It is based not only upon official Soviet publications but on literally hundreds of observations including principally reports of returnee POW's who worked on such construction, defectors, [REDACTED]

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CIA is not alone in stating that shelters are incorporated in new Soviet buildings. A West German civil defense publication has stated, "all new [Soviet] buildings must contain shelter." An Air Force memorandum, recently received, states, "All government buildings since World War II, public buildings and apartments alike, have been constructed with air raid shelters in basements."

In arriving at a similar conclusion we have considered several factors. First, there is evidence in several of the above sources of a general governmental order requiring this construction. Designs of such shelters have been openly published since about 1950 and references have appeared in Soviet publications to such construction "in accordance with a special plan for protecting the population." Sources of interrogation reports (German PW's and others "have noted several times that "all new buildings were provided with air raid shelters." Some were told these "had to be" included and in at least one instance Russian co-workers told a German workman that this was done in conformance with new Soviet air raid precaution legislation.

Second, we have in our files reports relating to approximately thirty cities in the USSR where basement shelters have been built. These include cities as widely spread as Verkhuta and Tashkent, Riga and Khabarovsk, Kiev, Moscow, ~~Shanghai~~ Alma Ata, Sverdlovsk, Stalingrad and Asbest. Construction in some cities is the subject of isolated reports, but others have been confirmed by tens of reports.

Third, the observations of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] are considered generally reliable.

Quotations from reports of this delegation include the following:

"Without any question the Soviets are putting bomb shelters in basements of most of these buildings."

"It is quite obvious that these [parts of basements] are being built as bomb shelters."

"In Soviet housing construction another item I believe noteworthy is the construction of bombshelters in basements... [these] appeared to be excellent bombshelters."

Last, other reasons for believing that basement shelter construction has been widespread include Soviet defense instructions for military troops and the civil population which assert that such shelters should be used to the extent available.

Within the European satellites, countries which reportedly require the inclusion of shelter during the course of new construction include Hungary, Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia with dates of initiation varying from 1950 to 1956. [REDACTED]

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They were told that such construction was mandatory in new buildings.

The case for heavy bunker construction in the USSR is based in part on satellite information. The interchange of civil defense

personnel between the USSR and the satellites, the similarity of civil defense literature in these areas as well as similarities in a number of organizational developments and procedures suggest that satellite civil defense is modeled after the Soviet program and we have several reports stating that it is, in fact, monitored by the USSR. Certainly, the satellites cannot be expected to carry on civil defense preparations in isolation, particularly heavy protective construction requiring large amounts of cement and steel and a considerable financial investment.

Existence of heavy shelter construction for the protection of Party and government is well established in numerous reports from Hungarian refugees. These describe a system of tunnels and galleries under the various hills in Budapest not only for an extensive air defense center but for the use of the government and its communications. In addition to this, there are large shelters under such buildings as the police, Party headquarters and official residences. (It was demonstrated in newspaper reports of underground strongholds at the time of the Hungarian uprising that such construction could be extensively accomplished without permitting the general public to become aware of it.)

Similar construction was reported from Czechoslovakia, and our attaches there recently confirmed the locations in Prague of three underground entrances, which were reported by other sources as large hillside air raid shelters.

It is known that the USSR had prepared shelters under principal government buildings and leaders' homes in Moscow during World War II.

Henry C. Cassidy reported on some of these in his book Moscow Satellite.

He also stated that the subway stations were equipped with steel doors and air filters. The construction of some new shelters both within and outside of Moscow has been the subject of a few unconfirmed reports and newspaper articles. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] This and other evidence supports our judgment that a shelter program system for protection of key government operations and personnel which has been evident in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and other satellites must also be under construction in the USSR.

Evidence of the preparation of air raid shelters in important factories has been extensive in the case of refugee reports from Hungary (and to a less conclusive degree in the other satellite nations). This information indicates the development of standard designs, refurbishing World War II shelters and building new shelters according to a graduated scale of strength since 1951. In the case of some munitions plants, the construction has been truly massive corresponding to the design shown in our exhibits but including also tunnel shelters and underground bunkers. Reliable information on the construction of industrial shelter in the USSR has been received in only a few cases but it is suspected that this may reflect limited observation due to tight security on the part of the USSR rather than absence of an active program. For example, three separate sources have reported one or two air raid bunkers in an automotive repair shop in Magadan. The construction of these was apparently going on from 1952 to 1955 and floor space indicated they would be more than adequate for the reported 1700 workmen. [REDACTED] report the construction of an

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underground shelter at the Kaganovich plant in Khabarovsk in 1932. A western visitor reported air raid shelters in a Soviet aircraft plant in 1934. Unconfirmed reports of enterprise shelters include locations at Kurch, Krasnotarsk, Khabarovsk, Stalino, Stens, Ryzda, Sverdlovsk, and the Odessa shipyards. In the Soviet Bloc scheme of things and in view of confirmed satellite activity, we do not believe these to be isolated instances reflecting only unique initiative on the part of individual management personnel.

Reports of protected communications centers are confirmed in refugee reports from Hungary and have been noted in reports from several other satellite nations. Two Hungarians report they were told

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[REDACTED] who had visited the USSR that the Soviets had underground radio stations, some with telescoping antennas. [REDACTED] visited a large radio

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jamming station near Moscow. He described a 300 by 80 foot camouflaged building with concrete walls, two feet thick. Three floors of this building extended underground with only one above. The underground floors contained the transmitters, generators, cooling and air conditioning equipment.

In recent telegrams from the American Embassy in Moscow (No. 896 of 4 November and No. 1210 of 9 January) it was reported that the Embassy had observed ~~xxx~~ no signs of a Soviet program to construct shelters. There may be a number of reasons for this:

1. There may be a degree of misunderstanding as to what constitutes basement shelters. The Soviet requirement for these has been stated to be they should be able to withstand complete collapse

of the overlying building. The use of steel structurals is not mandatory as suggested by the Embassy.

2. Lack of hermetic sealing and ventilating units in basements in early phases of construction would not be unusual; this would probably be accomplished later after the building has been completed.
3. Evidence indicates that Civilian shelter programs and much of the civil defense program are classified matters and would be concealed as much as possible from foreigners.

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Moreover, Soviet instructions clearly state that air raid shelter signs are not to be posted until the declaration of a "threatening situation" by the government.

4. Several qualified members of the [redacted] (to whom the Embassy referred in telegram #1210) were certain that new buildings contained air raid shelters. (Pictures taken [redacted] are included in our exhibits.) This and the fact that we have no reports of shelter construction from the Embassy leads us to discount the negative information received.

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5. It is, of course, possible that the basement construction which the Embassy personnel observed was not intended for shelter. We do not take the extreme position that each and every building contains shelter. We would suspect, however, that in the case of Moscow, where apartment shelters are not constructed, shelter provisions would be provided or programmed elsewhere in nearby areas.